Joan E. Schafer v. Nathan C. Schafer : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Joan E. Schafer v. Nathan C. Schafer : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
P. Gary Ferrero; Attorney for Appellee.
Mary C. Corporon; Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Schafer v. Schafer, No. 900002 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2412
U T A H CUUWi w r « i - r « r , - ^ 
BRIEF 
tr 
K r J 
DOCKET NO. • 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOAN E. SCHAFER, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
NATHAN C. SCHAFER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 900002-CA 
Priority Classification 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER ENTERED 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, IN THE FORM OF AN AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, ON OR ABOUT OCTOBER 17, 1989, THE 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, JUDGE PRESIDING. 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Appellant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street, #2400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
P. GARY FERRERO #1066 
Attorney for Appellee 
433 South 400 East 
P.O. Box 572476 




CteiKot the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOAN E. SCHAFER, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
NATHAN C. SCHAFER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 900002-CA 
Priority Classification 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER ENTERED 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, IN THE FORM OF AN AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, ON OR ABOUT OCTOBER 17, 1989, THE 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH, JUDGE PRESIDING. 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Appellant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
310 South Main Street, #2400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 328-1162 
P. GARY FERRERO #1066 
Attorney for Appellee 
433 South 400 East 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157 
(801) 261-0265 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OR ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 7 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN DOMESTIC CASES 
IS THAT THE LOWER COURT IS GIVEN WIDE 
LATITUDE AND DISCRETION 7 
II. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE 
TESTS IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
THEREFORE IT WAS WITHIN THE SOUND 
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO AWARD 
SAID FEES 9 
III. THE AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS PROPER IN THIS 
CASE BASED ON THE NEED AND FINANCIAL 
CONDITION OF THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE AND THE 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S ABILITY TO PAY . . . . 12 
CONCLUSION 15 
ADDENDA: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE A 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE B 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . C 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Anderson v. Anderson, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) 9,15 
Beales v. Beales. 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984) 10 
Bercrer v. Bercrer, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985) 8 
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, (Utah 1985) . . . 10 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 129 Utah Adv. Rpt. 
38, (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 7 
Erwin v. Erwin. 108 Utah Adv. Rpt. 55 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) 8 
Johnson v. Johnson, 323 P.2d 16 (Utah 1958) 8 
Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 14 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) 9 
Marchant v. Park City. 771 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 
Court App. 1989) 7 
Mauohan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) 11 
Munns v. Munns. 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 88 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) 12,14 
Olsen v. Olsen. 704 P.2d 654 (Utah 1985) 14,15 
Osguthorpe v. Osquthorpe. 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 21 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) 9,12 
Ostler v. Ostler. 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 15 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) 11,12 
Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) 14 
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1313 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) 10 
Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) 12 
iii 
Smith v . Smith, 726 P. 2d 4?.l (Utah 19H6) . 
S o r e n s o n v . S o r e n s o a , /f»4 I'. I'd H','11 (lllnli CI 
App. 1989) . . . 
W a l t h e r v . WalLliei 7 0') P . ?d "1117 (111 , i h I 4 H r> ) 
STATUES 
42 USC Sections 402(b)(1) and (3) (1976x 
42 USC Section 416(d) 'i''i 
Utah Code Ann. Sect 
RULES 
Rule 408, Utah Rules of Evicence 
Rule 68. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Section 
78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from the final judgment and order 
entered by the trial court herein, consisting of an Amended 
Decree of Divorce, on or about October 17, 1989. On 
December 26, 1989, at the request of Plaintiff's counsel, an 
Order Extending the Time for Appeal, extending the time for 
appeal to December 26, 1989, was signed and entered by the 
judge of the trial court. On December 26, 1989, Defendant 
filed his Notice of Appeal herein with the Third Judicial 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in the above-
captioned appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the lower court err in granting Plaintiff an 
award of attorney's fees in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00)? 
2. Did the lower court err in awarding Plaintiff 
permanent alimony. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or 
rules believed by Appellee to be wholly dispositive of the 
issues on appeal herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case arises out of a divorce proceeding 
that was initially heard before the Honorable John A. Rokich 
on or about January 5, 1989. (Appendix A - Decree of 
Divorce "DODM). 
2. The Decree of Divorce dissolved the marriage but 
did not dispose of other issues and these issues were 
reserved and heard at trial. (Appendix A - DOD). 
3. This matter was heard before the Honorable John 
A. Rokich on all other issues on or about July 13, 14, and 
17, 1989. 
4. Subsequent to the trial on the matter, the Court 
entered an Amended Decree of Divorce on or about October 27, 
1989. (Appendix B - Amended Decree of Divorce "ADOD"). 
5. The Court also entered amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law subsequent to the trial. (Appendix C 
- Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("AFOF"). 
6. The parties were married on or about July 27, 
1979, and the Decree of Divorce in this matter terminated 
the marriage on January 5, 1989, some six (6) months short 
of ten (10) years. (Appendix C - AFOF, paragraph 2). 
7. In determining the issue of alimony, the Court 
specifically found that the Plaintiff/Appellee was currently 
unemployed and was attending school full time as a student. 
(Appendix C - AFOF, paragraph 12). 
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8. While Appellee was unemployed, the Court did 
find that, because of current job skills, Plaintiff/Appellee 
was capable of earning $18,000.00 per year, or $1,500.00 per 
month, and imputed that income earning capability to the 
Plaintiff/Appellee for the purposes of alimony. (Appendix C 
- AFOF, paragraph 13). 
9. The Court also determined that the 
Defendant/Appellant was employed as a medical doctor and had 
a gross monthly income of $7,560.00. (Appendix C - AFOF, 
paragraph 14). 
10. The Court in this case also issues a Memorandum 
Decision as to questions of equitable restitution. 
(Appendix D - Memorandum Decision "Memo"). 
11. In its Memorandum Decision, the Court found 
that the Plaintiff/Appellee did not make sacrifices or 
contributions that increased the earning capacity of the 
Defendant, but did find that as a mother, the 
Plaintiff/Appellee did contribute to the family relationship 
(Appendix D - Memo, page 4). 
12. Based upon the findings of the Court, the Court 
awarded alimony to Plaintiff/Appellee for an indeterminant 
period of time in the sum of $650.00 per month. 
13. The Plaintiff requested payment of attorney's 
fees in the sum of $29,000.00. The Court reviewed the 
factors surrounding the attorney's fees, found that the 
hourly rate was reasonable, but that the Plaintiff had made 
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substantial demands upon counsel which were not necessary. 
Based upon its findings regarding the circumstances of the 
attorney's fees, the Court awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees 
in the sum of $10,000.00 (Appendix C - AFOF, paragraph 45). 
14. The other issues of property and custody were 
resolved by the Court and are not part of this appeal but 
are set forth in the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
15. In this matter, the lower court did extend the 
time to file an appeal to December 26, 1989. Both parties 
filed notices of appeal in this matter. However, 
Plaintiff's counsel withdrew and Plaintiff was not able to 
prosecute her appeal. Therefore, it was dismissed. 
16. Various extensions of time have been granted by 
the Court and all pleadings herein to date have been filed 
pursuant to those extensions of time. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In reviewing decisions of the Trial Court in 
domestic relations cases, the Appellate Courts give wide 
latitude to the discretion of the Trial Court. An appellant 
must show that the findings were clearly erroneous. The 
appellant has the obligation to marshall the record and 
present the record to the Appellate Court so the court can 
determine if the Trial Court abused its discretion and 
entered findings that were clearly erroneous. In this case, 
the Appellant has failed to even indicate which findings he 
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believes are clearly erroneous. No record of the trial has 
been referred to by Appellant and no action taken by the 
Court has been challenged on the basis of legal authority. 
The Appellant has failed to meet its burden as to the 
standard of review. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals has 
determined that the Trial Court has discretion to determine 
if attorney's fees are appropriate and if so, the amount of 
said fees. This is based upon the needs of the parties and 
what award would be reasonable. In this case, the Court 
specifically found that the income of the parties was 
substantially desparate and carefully reviewed the 
attorney's fees claim by the Plaintiff. The Court 
determined that $19,000.00 of the attorney's fees that were 
claimed was not reasonable under the circumstances. The 
Court did not find that the amount of time spent by counsel 
or the work performed was unreasonable, but rather the 
demands made were not appropriate. Therefore, the Trial 
Court awarded attorney's fees based on need and 
reasonableness and met the test required by the Appellate 
Courts. 
As to alimony, the Appellant appears not to question 
the amount of alimony, but rather only questions whether the 
Court should have made an award of rehabilitative alimony 
rather than the award of alimony for an indetermant time. 
In determining the alimony, the Trial Court must look at the 
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ability of the receiving spouse to produce income, the 
financial income and need of the receiving spouse and the 
ability of the paying spouse to pay alimony. In looking at 
these factors, the Trial Court is to keep in mind that the 
purpose of the award of alimony is to try and maintain the 
standard of living enjoyed by the parties, prevent the 
receiving spouse from becoming a public charge and to try 
and equalize the respective standards of living. In this 
regard, the Trial Court performed its function. It is clear 
from the court's finding as to respective incomes, that, 
absent an award of alimony, the Plaintiff/Appellee would not 
be able to even come close to maintaining a comparable 
standard of living. The Court took into account that 
Plaintiff was capable of earning income, but with her 
skills, it was also clear that she could not maintain the 
standard of living. The disparity between the parties, even 
with Plaintiff's skills, was such that the award of 
"permanent" alimony was proper. 
The Appellant has failed to set forth any findings 
that he claims were erroneous and has failed to set forth 
any authority to support the position of the Trial Court 
errored. Even if such authority was presented, the Trial 
Court's actions were within its discretion and were 
supported by its findings. Therefore, the lower court's 
determination should be upheld and under the circumstances 
of Plaintiff's impecuniosity, attorney's fees should be 
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awarded on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN DOMESTIC CASES IS THAT THE 
LOWER COURT IS GIVEN WIDE LATITUDE AND DISCRETION 
In this case, the Trial Court properly exercised its 
discretion. In prosecuting an appeal, the Appellant has the 
duty to marshall all the evidence supporting the Trial 
Court's findings and then demonstrate that such evidence is 
insufficient to support the court's findings. See Call v. 
City of West Jordan, 129 Utah Adv. Rpt. 38, 40 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) citing Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 682 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). In this case, the Appellant has 
failed to designate or set forth anything in the transcript 
or on the record to support a finding that the Trial Court 
made findings based on insufficient evidence. The Appellant 
goes so far as to request that the Appellate Court set aside 
the award of attorney's fees based upon the Trial Court's 
exclusion of evidence. Yet, the Appellant fails to 
designate a portion of the transcript to support the 
position that the evidence should have been admitted. Based 
on this factor alone, the Appellate Court could rule against 
the Appellant. 
In a myriad of cases, the courts have indicated that 
the Trial Court is the place to adjudicate domestic matters. 
This is "because the proper adjudication of matters is 
highly dependent upon personal equations which the Trial 
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Court is in an advantaged position to appraise." Smith v. 
Smith, 726 P.2d 423# 425 (Utah 1986) citing Johnson v. 
Johnson, 323 P.2d 16, 19 (Utah 1958). Both the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Appellate Court have indicated that they will 
not overturn a Trial Court's determination in domestic 
matters unless the Appellant can show a misapplication of 
the facts by the Trial Court in applying principles of law. 
Unless the evidence presented clearly preponderates to the 
contrary, the Trial Court's interpretation of the facts must 
be allowed by the Appellate Court, Berqer v. Berqer, 713 
P.2d 695 (Utah 1985). 
Since then, the courts have gone even farther. In 
Erwin v. Erwin, 108 Utah Adv. Rpt. 55 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
the court found that "we are not confined to the contents of 
a particular document entitled bindings'; rather the 
findings may be expressed orally from the bench or contained 
in other documents ..." at 56. Therefore, the Appellate 
Court is free to review all documents in the record, 
including the Memorandum Decision, and the initial Findings 
and Decree in determining whether the Trial Court abused its 
discretion. In reviewing these documents, the court will 
find that the Trial Court made specific findings regarding 
alimony and attorney's fees and that the Appellant has shown 
nothing in the record to overturn the findings. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE TESTS 
IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND THEREFORE IT WAS 
WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE Trial Court 
TO AWARD SAID FEES• 
This Court has long recognized that it is within the 
sound discretion of the Trial Court to assess the evidence 
in domestic cases and determine if an award of attorney's 
fees is appropriate, Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 
1980), Anderson v. Anderson, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). In determining whether an award of attorney's fees 
is appropriate, the Trial Court must find that the award is 
reasonable and that the needs of the requesting party 
compels the award. See Oscruthorpe v. Osquthorpe, 131 Utah 
Adv. Rpt. 21, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Sorenson v. Sorenson, 
769 P.2d 820, 832 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and Walther v. 
Walther 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985). In these cases, the court 
held that the factors to be used in determining 
reasonableness went to the necessity for the number of hours 
utilized, the reasonableness of the rate charged, result 
accomplished and the rates commonly charged for similar 
services, Sorenson. 
Here the Court went through a very lengthy 
discussion regarding the attorney's fees. The Court had 
already determined that the incomes of the parties were 
desparate and that the other factors in determining the 
reasonableness of the attorney's fees were present. The one 
thing the Court did do was determine that only a portion of 
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the hours were reasonably necessary. See Appendix C, 
paragraph 45. Therefore, the Trial Court went through the 
analysis required under Utah law in making a determination 
of reasonableness and need for the award of attorney's fees. 
This determination of reasonableness is further supported by 
the factors enunciated by this Court in Rasband v. Rasband, 
752 P.2d 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) citing Beales v. Beales, 
682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984) and Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 
P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985). The Trial Court soundly 
exercised its discretion and its determination is supported 
by the findings in the record. The Appellant has set forth 
no evidence to support a finding that the Trial Court 
improperly exercised its discretion in this matter. 
The Appellant did introduce the question of the 
proposed Pre-trial Settlement Agreement. The Appellant 
claims that a proposed Pre-trial Settlement Agreement was 
submitted as evidence to show that the Appellee had "run up" 
attorney's fees when she could have settled a year prior to 
trial. The Appellant, however, does not make any reference 
to the trial transcript where this exclusion supposedly 
happened. In light of the cases cited above, absent a 
record on this matter, the Appellate Court should decline to 
even rule on this issue. 
However, if the Appellate Court should look at the 
supposed exclusion of the proposed Pre-Trial Settlement 
Agreement, there are other factors to support its exclusion. 
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If in fact the Trial Court did exclude the proposed Pre-
trial Settlement Agreement as evidence to deny Appellee's 
claim for attorney's fees, it was properly done. The 
submission of pre-trial negations for settlement to support 
or attack a claim is improper under Rule 408 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. In that the Defendant/Appellant claimed 
he was using the proposed agreement to counter Plaintiff's 
claim for attorney's fees, this goes directly to the 
question of liability for her claim. Therefore, Rule 408 
would specifically exclude any evidence. The only argument 
that could be made in supporting the acceptance of the 
proposed Pre-trial Settlement Agreement as evidence is if it 
qualified as an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It did not. Rule 68 
specifically refers to actions for money judgments only and 
a divorce proceeding is an equitable proceeding, not a 
proceeding for money judgment. 
This Court held in Ostler v. Ostler, 131 Utah Adv. 
Rpt. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that it could be appropriate 
for the Court to award attorney's fees on appeal, see 
Mauohan v. Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In 
that decision, the court relies on Utah Code Ann. Section 
30-3-3 (1989). In this case, Plaintiff's original counsel 
withdrew as counsel and Plaintiff was unable to proceed with 
her appeal pro se. As a result, her appeal was dismissed. 
Plaintiff/Appellee was only able to obtain counsel through 
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the pro bono attorney program at Utah Legal Services, Inc. 
Plaintiff/Appellee is clearly impecunious and, based on the 
court's language in Ostler^ an award of attorney's fees on 
appeal would be appropriate. Therefore, the 
Plaintiff/Appellee respectfully requests this Court to 
extend the grant of attorney's fees made by the Trial Court 
to include attorney's fees on appeal. 
Ill 
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY WAS PROPER IN THIS CASE BASED 
ON THE NEED AND FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE AND THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S 
ABILITY TO PAY. 
In determining the need for alimony in a particular 
case, the Trial Court must look to three basic 
circumstances. The Trial Court should look at the financial 
condition and the need of the receiving spouse, the ability 
of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income and the 
ability of the paying spouse to pay alimony, Oscruthorpe 
at 23 citing Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). In this case, the court made specific 
findings as to the financial ability of the Plaintiff. The 
Court specifically found that she was unemployed at the time 
of trial but she had the ability to earn $18,000.00 per 
year, or $1,500.00 per month. The Court also specifically 
found that the Defendant/Appellant was currently employed 
and earning in excess of $7,500.00 per month. From these 
findings, the Appellant had the ability to pay the alimony 
awarded of $650.00 per month. It was also determined by the 
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Court that the amount of income that the Plaintiff/Appellee 
could earn was not sufficient. 
In determining the sufficiency of the alimony, the 
Trial Court needed to look at other factors. In determining 
whether or not a party has sufficient income, the Court must 
look at the purpose for an award of alimony. The Utah 
courts have held that the purposes for an award of alimony 
are to maintain the standard of living as close to that of 
the marriage as possible, prevent the receiving spouse from 
becoming a public charge and to equalize the respective 
standards of living, Munns v. Munns, 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 88 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) citing numerous cases for support. 
Therefore, in determining whether Appellee had sufficient 
income without an award of alimony, the Court needed to 
examine the standard of living. The Court made extensive 
findings regarding the financial condition of the parties. 
See Appendix C - AFOF. From these findings, it was clear 
that, absent an award of alimony, the Plaintiff was not 
capable of ever reaching the point of earning a sufficient 
income to attain the standard of living previously enjoyed 
during the marriage. 
During the marriage, the parties earned in excess of 
$7,500.00 per month. Based on the findings of the Trial 
Court, the Defendant/Appellant would continue to earn that 
amount. However, the Appellee was only capable of earning 
$1,500.00 per month. This sum, added to an award of child 
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support of $1,183.00, was less than one-third of the income 
enjoyed by the parties during the marriage. Even with the 
$650.00 in alimony, Appellee's income would be less than 
half of the previous family income and yet she would have 
two-thirds of the family living with her. This was true 
while Defendant's income would be reduced by only $1,833.00 
per month. Therefore, the amount of alimony awarded was 
appropriate. 
This Court has determined in numerous cases that an 
award of alimony for an indeterminant period of time, 
"permanent" alimony, is appropriate under certain 
circumstances. The Utah courts have determined that, based 
upon a party's marketable skills, professional training and 
ability to earn, if the party would not be able to enter the 
job market and support himself or herself in anything even 
resembling the style in which the couple had been living, an 
award of "permanent" alimony is appropriate. See Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 
96 (Utah 1986), Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 654 (Utah 1985) and 
most recently, the Munns decision. In this case, the Trial 
Court found that Appellee was capable of earning $1,500.00 
per month. This was based upon her skills and previous 
earning capacity. This sum fits the test of her not being 
able to "enter the job market and support herself in 
anything even resembling the style in which the couple had 
been living," Jones at 1075. 
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The Trial Court did find that Appellee was a full 
time student. It is possible that the Appellee may have an 
increased income upon graduation. Should this occur, 
however, it would then be appropriate for the court to 
determine if the alimony should remain in place. The Court 
should not speculate until such time as the income becomes 
definite and actual. If that should occur, the Court 
retains jurisdiction and can modify the amount. See Olsen 
at 567 and Anderson at 479. 
It should also be noted that the Appellant pushed to 
have the Divorce Decree entered prior to the expiration of 
ten (10) years. If Appellee had been married to the 
Appellant for ten (10) years, she would then be eligible for 
divorce spouse benefits under the Social Security Act. See 
42 U.S.C. Sections 402(b)(1)(3) and 416(d)(1). If the Court 
had merely waited seven (7) months to enter the Decree of 
Divorce, the Plaintiff would qualify for social security 
benefits. In that the Court granted Defendant's Motion to 
Bifurcate and granted the Decree of Divorce prior to the ten 
(10) year requirement, these benefits are lost. Therefore, 
it is appropriate for the award of alimony to be permanent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant in this case has simply failed to meet 
the standard required to overturn a Trial Court's decision 
in a domestic case. The Appellate Court, in reviewing the 
Trial Court's decision, must give the Trial Court wide 
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latitude and absent a showing that the Trial Court abused 
its discretion and entered findings that are clearly 
erroneous, the Trial Court's determinations must be upheld. 
The Appellant has made no attempt to show that the Trial 
Court abused its discretion and made findings that were 
clearly erroneous. The failure to designate parts of the 
transcript to show that the Court relied on evidence that 
was inappropriate shows that the evidence simply must not 
exist. 
If the Appellate Court, absent the Appellant's 
showing of evidence, still reviews the Court's findings to 
determine their sufficiency, it is clear that the Trial 
Court entered sufficient findings for its decision. The 
Trial Court applied the proper standards in awarding both 
attorney's fees and "permanent" alimony. Therefore, the 
Appellee respectfully requests that this Court uphold the 
Trial Court's decision, also award the Appellee's attorney's 
fees on appeal, and remand the case for further proceedings 
on the amount of attorney's fees for the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this U day of March, 
1991. 
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MARY C. CORPORON 734 
Attorney for Defe* *nt 
CORPORON & WILLIAfc 
Suite 1100 - Bostor Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City# Utai 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IM THE 1 TRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR S T LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
JOAN E. SCHAFER, 
Plaintiff, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
_vs~ 'ivil No. 884902670DA 
NATHAN C. SCHArER, u ie John A. Rokich 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having . -me on for hearing before 
the above-entitled court on Thursday, uhe 5th day of January, 
1989, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge presiding, plaintiff 
being present in person and through her counsel, and defendant 
being present in person and through his counsel of record, Mary 
C. Corporon, more than 90 days having elapsed since the filing of 
the Complaint in this action and the Court having previously 
signed and entered an Order Granting Motion for Bifurcated Trial, 
the Court proceeded to hear the sworn testimony of the parties; 
based thereon, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court 
having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now, therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Flaintiff and defendant are each hereby granted a Decree 
Third juaiciai uisinci 
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of Divorce from the other, dissolving the bonds of matrimony 
heretofore existing between the parties, the same to become final 
and effective immediately upon being signed by the Judge and 
entered by the clerk in the register of actions. 
2. All remaining outstanding issues in this matter are 
reserved for further trial in this case. 
3. Until the trial of the reserved issues in this matter, 
the temporary order previously entered by this Court shall remain 
in full force and effect. 
DATED THIS <^ T~ day of January, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
Tu 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL OOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT. 8ALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF 
DATE. 
' OEPUTY COURT CLERK 
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APPENDIX B 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
JOAN E. SCHAFER, 
Plaintiff, AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
-vs- Civil No. 884S02670DA 
NATHAN C. SCHAFER, Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER havi.vg come on for trial before 
the above-entitled court on the 13th, 14th and 17th days of July, 
1989, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge presiding, plaintiff 
being present in person and through her counsel of record, David 
5, Dolowitz, and the defendant being present in person and 
through his counsel of record, Mary C. Ccrporon, the Court having 
proceeded to hear the sworn testimony of the parties and their 
witnesses, having received the exhibits of the parties and having 
heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the file and 
the pleadings contained therein, the Court being fully advised in 
the premises and more than 90 days having elapsed since the 
filing of the Complaint for Divorce in this action, and having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now, therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the two minor children of the parties, Zachary and 
Lillian, subject to defendant's reasonable and liberal rights of 
visitation. 
2. Defendant is awarded visitation with the minor children 
of the parties, including a minimum of the following: 
a. Every other weekend, from Friday evening until 
Sunday evening; 
b. One day in the middle of each week; 
c. Alternate state and federal holidays; 
d. An extended period of time, up to four weeks each 
summer; 
e. Plaintiff shall have the children with her on 
Mother's Day and her birthday, each year, and defendant shall 
have Father's Day and his birthday with the children each year, 
irrespective of any other portion of this visitation schedule; 
f. Defendant is awarded reasonable and liberal 
telephone access to the minor children of the parties; 
g. Defendant shall be granted access, at all times, to 
the educational and health care records of the children. 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties, defendant is 
hereby ordered to exercise his visitation with the minor children 
of the parties. 
3. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay child support to the 
plaintiff, for the support and maintenance of the minor children 
of the parties in the total sura of One Thousand One Hundred 
Eicjhty-Three Dollars ($1,183.00) per month, oc Five Hundred 
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Ninety-One Dollars and Fifty Cents ($591.50) per month, per 
child, payable through the Clerk of this Court, until each child 
has attained the age of 18 years or graduated from high school in 
the normal course of their high school educations, whichever 
event occurs later. Said child support shall abate by 50% during 
any period of time in which the defendant has the actual physical 
care, custody and control of the minor children for 25 or more 
consecutive days. 
4. If the defendant falls thirty (30) or more days in 
arrears in his child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seg. (Supp. 1988). 
5. Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain health and 
accident insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children 
of the parties as such is available through his employment, until 
each child has attained the age of 18 years or graduated from 
high school, whichever last occurs. The parties are ordered to 
share equally in payment of any non-routine medical and dental 
expenses incurred for the benefit of the minor children which are 
not covered by defendant's policy of health and accident 
insurance. The plaintiff is ordered to pay and assume all 
routine medical and dental expenses incurred for the benefit of 
the minor children. 
6. Defendant is hereby ordered to maintain in force a 
policy of life insurance on his own life, having a minimum 
benefit payable on death of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($300,000.00), naming the minor children as the sole primary 
beneficiaries thereof. Said insurance coverage shall continue in 
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effect until each child achieves the age of 18 years or graduates 
from high school in the normal course of his or her education, 
whichever event occurs later. Defendant is hereby awarded the 
cash surrender value of any life insurance policies he presently 
owns, as his sole and separate property. 
7. Each party is awarded his or her own items of 
personal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings. 
8. The parties' previous division of their items of 
furniture, fixtures, appliances and household goods is confirmed 
in each and each party is hereby awarded all such items presently 
in his or her own possession. 
9. Plaintiff is hereby awarded all interest and monies 
received as a result of the rebate previously received by 
plaintiff for the parties' 1988 Utah State Income Taxes in the 
approximate sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), free and clear 
of any interest of the defendant. 
10. Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the 
plaintiff and defendant are hereby ordered to file, and cooperate 
in the filing of, joint federal and state income tax returns for 
the 19 88 tax year. The parties shall share equally in any refund 
received by reason of that joint income tax filing- The 
defendant is ordered to pay and assume and hold plaintiff 
harmless on any income tax liability incurred by reason of the 
joint filing. In the event that the University of• Utah should 
seek a refund of a PEL grant and/or any financial assistance 
granted to plaintiff during the 1988/1989 academic year due to 
this joint filing, defendant is ordered to pay any refund to the 
University of Utah so requested by the University of Utah and to 
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hold the plaintiff harmless thereon. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the diamond ring valued at 
Ten Thousand Eight: Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($10,875.00)/ 
free and clear of any interest of the defendant. 
12. The retirement accounts held in the name of the 
defendant and acquired through defendant's employment with the 
University of Utah and the United States Government shall be 
divided equally between the parties, according to the Woodward 
formula, one-half to each, This Court should issue the 
appropriate allocations or qualified domestic relations orders 
distributing these retirement accounts accordingly. 
13. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the 1983 Subaru GL10 
automobile and plaintiff is hereby awarded the 1985 Volkswagen 
Jetta automobile, each free and clear of any interest of the 
other party. 
14. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the Keystone account as her 
sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest of the 
defendant. Defendant is hereby awarded the Merrill Lynch account 
as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest 
of the plaintiff. Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the 
sum of Seven Thousand Four Hundred Forty-One Dollars ($7,441*00) 
as a marital property settlement herein. 
15. Plaintiff is hereby awarded all right, title and 
interest in her banking accounts with Tracy Collins Bank, free 
and clear of any interest of the defendant. Defendant is hereby 
av/arded all right, title and interest in his banking accounts 
with the University of Utah Credit Union, free and clear of any 
interest of the plaintiff. 
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16. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay alimony to the 
plaintiff in the sum of Six Hundred Fifty Dollars ($650-00) per 
month, said alimony to continue until the death of the plaintiff, 
the death of the defendant or the remarriage or cohabitation of 
the plaintiff, whichever first occurs. 
17. In the event that any deficiency judgment is assessed 
against the parties as a result of the foreclosure on their 
marital residence, the parties are ordered to share equally in 
payment of the same, and each shall be ordered to hold the other 
harmless on one-half of any such obligation. Plaintiff is hereby 
ordered to pay and assume the debts and obi igations to her 
parents, the debt for her moving expenses and the debt for her 
counseling costs, and is ordered to hold the defendant harmless 
thereon• E3ch party is hereby ordered to p^y and assume all 
debts and obligations incurred in his or her own name since the 
date of filing of the Complaint for Divorce in this action and 
each is ordered to hold the other harmless thereon. 
18. Plaintiff is denied any award of equitable restitution. 
19. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff and/or 
plaintiff's counsel the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) 
representing a portion of plaintiff's court costs and attorney's 
fees incurred herein. With Lhis exception, each parLy is hereby 
ordered to pay and assume his or her own court costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in this matter. 
20. Each party is hereby ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein. 
21. P].:i;it iff's previous s.irnaira is h-sroLy rc-::tor^ d to her 
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and she shall be known hereafter as "Joan Donato." 
22. Neither party is found to be in contempt of this Court 
at this time. 
DATED THIS day of November, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
Distiict Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I era employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing proposed Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to be served upon plaintiff by placing a true 
and correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
and depositing the same in the United States mail at Salt Lake 





MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Defendant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
JOAN E. SCHAFER, 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs- Civil No, 884902670DA 
NATHAN C. SCHAFER, Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before 
the above-entitled court on the 13th, 14th and 17th days of July, 
1989, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge presiding, plaintiff 
being present in person and through her counsel of record, David 
S. Dolowitz, and the defendant being present in person and 
through his counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon, the Court having 
proceeded to hear the sworn testimony of the parties and their 
witnesses, having received the exhibits of the parties and having 
heard the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the file and 
the pleadings contained therein, the Court being fully advised in 
the premises and more than 90 days having elapsed since the 
filing of the Complaint for Divorce in this action, and good 
cause appearing therefor, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDIHGS OF FACT 
1. At the time of the trial both plaintiff and defendant 
were residents of Salt Lake County# State of Utah, and had been 
so for a period of three months or more immediately prior to the 
filing of the Complaint in this action. 
2. The parties to this action were previously husband and 
wife, having been married on July 27, 1979 in Slippery Rock, 
Pennsylvania and having been divorced by a Decree of Divorce 
entered herein on or about January 5, 1989. The Decree of 
Divorce reserved all issues remaining as between the parties, 
with the exception of the entry of the divorce itself. 
3. The parties to this action are the parents of two minor 
children, namely: Zachary, born April 27, 1983; and Lillian, 
born June 19, 1985. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be 
awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the minor 
children of the parties, subject to defendant's reasonable and 
liberal rights of visitation. 
4. Defendant's rights of visitation with the minor children 
should include the following: 
a. Every other weekend, from Friday evening until 
Sunday evening; 
b. One day in the middle of each week; 
c. Alternate state and federal holidays; 
d. An extended period of time, up to four weeks each 
suminer; 
e. Plaintiff should have the children with her on 
Mother's Day and her birthday, each year, and defendant should 
have father's Day and his birthday wLth the children each year, 
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irrespective of any other portion of this visitation schedule; 
f. Defendant should have reasonable and liberal 
telephone access to the minor children of the parties; 
g. Defendant should be granted access, at all times, 
to the children's educational and health care records. 
5. Defendant should be ordered to exercise visitation with 
the minor children of the parties, based upon the stipulation of 
the parties to such an order. 
6. Defendant should be ordered to pay child support to the 
plaintiff, for the support and maintenance of the minor children 
cf the parties, pursuant to his child support guideline worksheet 
submitted to the Court at the time of trial and designated as 
••Defendant's Exhibit 1. " Specifically, said support should be in 
the total amount of Five Hundred Ninety-One Dollars ($591.50) per 
month, por child, for a total of One Thousand One JTu.»dred Eighty-
Three Dollars ($1,183.00) per month, as and for child support, 
said support to continue until such time as the minor children 
achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from high school in the 
normal course of their high school educations, whichever event 
ocrurs later. Said child support should be payable through the 
cleric of this Court. Further, said child support should abate by 
50% during any period of time in which the defendant has the 
actual physical care, custody and control of the minor children 
for 25 or more consecutive days. 
7. If the defendant falls thirty (30) or more days in 
arrears in his child support obligation, the plaintiff should be 
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1968). 
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8. Defendant should be ordered to maintain health and 
accident insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children 
of the parties as such is available through his employment, until 
each child has attained the age of 18 years or graduated from 
high school, whichever last occurs. The parties should be 
ordered to share equally in payment of any non-routine medical 
and dental expenses incurred for the benefit of the minor 
children which are not covered by defendant's policy of health 
and accident insurance^ Tho plaintiff flhnplri he ordered to pay 
and assume ^STt-routina medical and dental expenses incurrecT^for 
the benefit of the minor children and should hold tfie~~defentiafir£ 
harmless thereon. 
9. Defendant should be ordered to maintain a policy of life 
insuranre on his own life, having a minimum benefit payable on 
death of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00), naming the 
minor children as the sole onwrfarv beneficiaries thereof, said 
insurance to continue until the children achieve the age of 18 
years or graduate from high school in the normal course of their 
education, whichever event occurs latet^ Defendant ^j\ould be 
awarded the cash surrender value of any lite insurance policies 
he presently owns, as his sol-* and separate property. 
10. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
acquired certain items of personal effects, jewelry, clothing and 
belongings. Each party should be awarded his or her own such 
items of personalty. 
11. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
acquired various items of furniture, fixtures, appliances and 
household goodn, which items have boen previously divided by tho 
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parties and which division should be confirmed in each, with each 
party to be awarded all such items presently in his or her own 
possession. 
12. At the time of trial herein, plaintiff was not employed 
outside the home and was attending school full-time as a student 
at the University of Utah. At the time of trial herein, 
plaintiff anticipated she would graduate in late 1990 or early 
1991 with a Bachelor's degree* 
13. Plaintiff's expert at trial, Dr. Steve Reynolds, an 
economist, testified that plaintiff is capable of obtaining 
employment in the State of Utah with her current job skills and 
experience at an income of Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) 
per year. Based upon this testimony, the Court attributes an 
income-earning capability to the plaintiff, for purposes of 
calculating alimony, in the sum of Eighteen Thousand Dollars 
($38,000.00) per year. 
11. At the time of trial herein defendant was employed as a 
medical doctor at the University of Utah and at the United States 
Veterans Administration Hospital, both in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
at a total gross monthly income of Seven Thousand Five Hundred 
Sixty Dollars ($7,560.00) per month for both jobs. 
15. At the time of trial herein, plaintiff was 40 years of 
age and defendant was 37 years of age. Plaintiff was previously 
married, prior to the time she became married to the defendant in 
this action, and had one child by that marriage, a minor 
daughter, who was 16 years of age at the time of trial herein. 
At the time of the trial herein, plaintiff was entitled to 
receive the sum of Two Hundred Forty Dollars ($.740.00) per month 
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as and for support for her daughter. As of the time of trial 
herein, plaintiff had never petitioned any court to increase the 
child support obligation owing for her child by her former 
husband. 
16. At the time the parties to this action were married, in 
July 1979, defendant had already graduated from medical school 
and was already a medical doctor, having completed his M.D. 
degree in May 1979. 
17. At the time of the parties' marriage the plaintiff was 
employed by Huron Road Hospital, as an administrative assistant, 
at an annual salary of approximately Thirteen Thousand Dollars 
($13,000.00). As of the date of the parties' marriage, plaintiff 
had completed some course work toward a degree from a college or 
university at several institutions, but had not obtained a degree 
from a college or university. 
18. At the time of the parties' marriage, plaintiff was the 
fee title holder of certain real property, consisting of a 
single-family dwelling in Cleveland, Ohio, subject to a first 
mortgage obligation on that property and subject to a lien 
thereon in favor of her former husband. 
19. Immediately upon the parties' marriage, the defendant 
moved to Alrron, Ohio to complete an internship at Akron City 
Hospital from July 1979 through June 1980. During the 
defendant's internship at Akron City Hospital, plaintiff resided 
in her home in Cleveland, Ohio, until November 1979, and then 
moved to Akron, Ohio to reside with the defendant, thus 
terminating her employment with the Huron Road Hospital in 
Cleveland, Ohio. 
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20. After defendant completed his internship at the Akron 
City Hospital he completed his residency at the Akron Community 
Hospital in Akron, Ohio. During the years of the parties' 
marriage when defendant completed his internship and/or residency 
in Akron, Ohio, the parties resided in TOcron, Ohio, Hudson, Ohio 
and Stowe, Ohio, all suburbs of the Akron, Ohio area. Each 
residential move within the Akron, Ohio area, from Akron to 
Hudson, and from Hudson tc Stowe, was made based upon a mutual 
agreement between the parties and because the parties were 
seeking better living accommodations within the Akron, Ohio area. 
21. Defendant became board certified in 1984. 
22. Plaintiff attended college in Ohio off and on from 1980 
through 1983. 
23. Plaintiff and defendant moved from Stowe, Ohio to Salt 
Lake City, Utah, in 1983 to enable defendant to accept employment 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
24. The parties moved from Salt Lake City, Utah to 
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania to enable defendant to accept employment. 
The parties resided in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania for approximately 
one year, from 1986 to 1987. 
25. In 1987, the parties returned from Pittsburg to Salt 
Lake City, Utah to enable defendant to accept employment at the 
University of Utah and VA Hospital in Salt Lake City. 
26. Plaintiff consented to the moves from Ohio to Salt Lake 
City, from Salt Lake City to Pittsburg, Pennsylvania and from 
Pittsburg to Salt Lake City. 
27. Plaintiff continued to attend college off and on, on 
both occasions vhen she resiled in Salt Lake City. As of the end 
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of winter quarter# 1988, plaintiff had completed or had been 
given transfer credits for 315 quarter hours toward her degree at 
the University of Utah. 
28. The minor child of the parties, Zachary, was in day 
care on a regular basis from age six months on, with the 
exceiJtion of the period of time when the parties resided in 
Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. The minor child of the parties, 
Lillian, was in day care on a regular basis from age one year on. 
29. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
retained services of a maid or housekeeper off and on to assist 
the plaintiff with housework in the parties' home. 
30. From the time defendant ceased her employment^with the 
Huron Road Hospital in Cleveland, Ohio in November 1979 until the 
separation of the parties in May 1988, defendant supported the 
plaintiff's minor child from a previous marriage, with the 
exception of the Two Hundred Forty Dollars ($240*00) plaintiff 
received for the support of said child from the child's natural 
father. 
31. From the date the plaintiff terminated her employment 
with the Uurc n Road Hospital in Cleveland, Ohio in November 1979, 
until 1982, defendant paid the mortgage, real property taxes and 
insurance on the plaintiff's residence in Cleveland, Ohio, with 
the exception of a period of approximately one y^ar, during which 
the parties received sporadic r*nt payments from tenants for a 
portion of the expenses of that property. 
32- Tn 1932 plaintiff sold her former nurital residence in 
Cleveland, Ohio. The parties' testimony differed as to the 
amount of net proceeds received from the salt c,f that propsxty 
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after BatiBfaction of the outstanding mortgage indebtedness and 
the lien obligation owing thereon to plaintiff's former husband. 
Plaintiff testified that she received—net-—proceeds of 
approximately Seventeen Thousand Dollarsr^l$17,000.00) f^rom the 
sale of the real property and defendant testified that plaintiff, 
received approximately Eleven Thousand Dollars ($11,000.00) net 
proceeds from that sale. The Court finds that the determination 
of the exact amount of net proceeds received from the sale of the 
Cleveland, Ohio property is not material to determination of this 
case. The net proceeds from the sale of the plaintiff's property 
in Cleveland, Ohio were placed in a joint savings account in the 
nain^ s of both parties. 
33. In 3982, from the joint savings account of the parties, 
the defendant purchaned a Porsche automobile, which was titled 
solely and exclusively in the name of the defendant, and which 
defendant owned and drove as his motor vehicle, for approximately 
one year. Thereafter, defendant sold this automobile at a 
profit, and all of the proceeds of that sale, including the 
profit, were placed back into the joint savings account of the 
parties. 
34. Tn 1983, upon moving to Salt Lake City, Utah, the 
parties purchased a residence in Salt Lake County, hereinafter 
described as the "marital residence." This propexty was acquired 
by the parties for a purchase price of One Hundred Sixty-Nine 
Thousand Dollars ($169,000.00). The parties made a down payment 
on this marital residence of Seventeen Thousand Dollars 
($17,000.00) and financed the balance, of One Hundred Fifty-Two 
Thousand Dollars ($152,000.00), purnnant to a variable rate 
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mortgage. The title to the marital residence was held jointly in 
the names of both parties. The source of funds for the down 
payment on the marital residence was Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) from defendant's bonus from Akron City Hospital and 
Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) from the joint savings account 
of the parties. The last monthly payment obligation which the 
parties owed to the mortgage holder on the marital residence was 
in the approximately sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($1,500.00), including principal, interest, taxes and insurance. 
The parties ceased making monthly payments on the marital 
residence in the summer of 1988, and the property was foreclosed 
upon and sold pursuant to a trustee's sale in June 1989. As of 
the date of trial herein, the property had been lost to 
foreclosure. As of the date when the parties ceased making the 
monthly mortgage payments on the property, the property had a 
-negative value- to the parti.-.s, in that the outstanding mortgage 
obligation and costs of sale exceeded the fair market value of 
the property by reason of declining market values in Salt Lake 
County from 1983 through 1988. All.of the parties' investment in 
the marital residence had been lost by reason of the declining 
market value at the time of the parties' separation. The sole 
source of payments made on the marital residence from 1983 
through 1988 was the income of the defendant. 
35. The parties received a tax rebate from the State of 
Utah in October 1988 in the approximate sum of Five Hundred 
Dollars ($500.00), representing a rebate on their Utah State 
Income Taxes for 1988. The plaintiff endorsed this check and 
cashed it. This distribution of these funds to the plaintiff 
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should be affirmed and plaintiff should be awarded the 1988 tax 
rebate of the parties as her sole and separate propertyf free and 
clear of any interest of the defendant. 
36. Plaintiff and defendant stipulated at the time of trial 
herein that the parties should file joint state and federal 
income tax returns for the tax year 1988# with defendant to be 
solely responsible for any tax liability incurred by reason of 
the filing of the joint returns and with the parties to share 
equally in any refunds if any are to be received. Based upon 
this stipulation, this Court should order that the parties 
cooperate in the filing of joint 1988 federal and state income 
tax returns. The parties should be ordered to share equally in 
any refund received by reason of that joint income tax filing. 
The defendant should be ordered to pay and assume and hold 
plaintiff harmless on any income tax liability incurred by reason 
of the joint filings. In the event that the University of Utah 
should seek a refund of a PEL grant and/or any financial 
assistance granted to plaintiff dvring the 1988/1989 academic 
year by reason of plaintiff's separation frcm defendant and by 
reason of this filing of a joint tax return for 1988, then 
defendant should be ordered to make any refund to the University 
of Utah so requested by the University of Utah and should be 
ordered to hold the plaintiff harmless thereon. 
37. During the course of the parties' marriage the 
plaintiff has acquired an interest in a diamond ring which the 
plaintiff insured at a value of Ten Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Five Dollars ($10,875.00). The Court places the value of 
thij ring at Ten Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-rive Dollars 
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($10#875.00). The diamond ring should be awarded to plaintifff 
free and clear of any interest of the defendant. 
38. During the course of the parties' marriage the 
defendant has acquired an interest in certain retirement accounts 
through the University of Utah in the TIAA/CREF retirement plan 
and through the United States Government through his employment 
with the United States Veteran Administration Hospital. Both 
these retirement accounts should be divided equally between the 
parties# according to the Woodward formula, one-half to each, and 
the appropriate allocations orders should issue from this Court 
distributing these retirement accounts accordingly. 
39. During the course of their marriage, the parties 
acquired an interest in certain motor vehicles, including a 1983 
Subaru GL10 and a 1985 Volkswagen Jetta. The Subaru should be 
awarded to the plaintiff, free and clear of any interest of the 
defendant. The Jetta should be awarded to the defendant, free 
and clear of any interest of the plaintiff. Neither rooter 
vehicle is encumbered by any obligation. The motor vehicle 
awarded to the plaintiff has an approximate fair market value of 
One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1#500.00) and the motor 
vehicle awarded to the defendant has an approximate fair market 
value of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00). 
40. During the course of their marriage the parties 
acquired an interest in various savings and investment accounts, 
including accounts at Merrill Lynch and Keystone. The Court 
finds that at the time of filing of the Complaint for Divorce 
horein, the Morrill Lynch account had a value of Thirty-One 
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars ($31,193.00), less 
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withdrawals of Two Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Three Dollars 
($2,253.00) and Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) to pay debts 
and attorney's fees. At the time of the filing of the Complaint 
for Divorce herein the Keystone account liad a value of Nine 
Thousand Three Hundred Eighteen Dollars ($9,318.00). Each party 
should receive Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Nine Dollars 
(^17,629.00) as his or her share of the Merrill Lynch and 
Keystone accounts. The plaintiff should receive the Keystone 
account as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any 
interest of the defendant, and the defendant should be ordered to 
pay to plaintiff an additional Seven Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Six Dollars ($7,876.00) as a maiital property settlement 
herein, less a credit to deferiant of Four Hundred Thirty-Five 
Dollars ($435.00) representing payments maJe by defendant for the 
plaintiff's car repairs and Visa account during the parties' 
separation. Defendant should be awarded all right, title and 
interest in the Merrill Lynch account of the parties, free and 
clear of any interest of the plaintiff. 
41. Plaintiff should be awarded all right, title and 
interest in her banking accounts with Tracy Collins Bank, free 
and clear of any interest of the defendant. Defendant should be 
awaried all right, title and interest in his banking accounts 
with the University of Utah Credit Unirn, free and clear of any 
interest of the plaintiff. 
42. Defnndant should be ordered to pay alimony to the 
plaintiff in the sum of Six Hundred Fifty Dollars ($650.00) per 
month, said alimony to continue until the death of the plaintiff, 
the doath of the defendant or the rcuairiago or cob&bitaiion of 
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the plaintiff# whichever first occurs. 
43. During the course of their marriage the parties have 
incurred various debts and obligations, including the possibility 
of a deficiency judgment to be assessed against the parties by 
reason of the foreclosure on the marital residence, an obligation 
owing by the plaintiff to her parents# plaintiff's moving 
expenses by reason of her move from the marital residence of the 
parties upon its foreclosure, and plaintiff's counseling costs. 
The parties should be ordered to share equally in any deficiency 
assessed against them by reason of the foreclosure of the marital 
residence, and each should Le ordered to hold the other harmless 
on one-half of any such obligation. Plaintiff should be ordered 
to pay and assume the debts and obligations to her parents, for 
her moving expenses and for her counseling costs, and should be 
ordered to hold the defendant liarmless thereon. Each party 
should be ordered to pay and assume all d-.*bts and obligations 
incurred in his or her own name, commencing with the date of 
filing of the Complaint for Divorce in this action and each 
should be ordered to hold the other harmless thereon. 
44. In addressing the issue of plaintiff's claim for 
equitable restitution against the defendant, the Court has 
considered the following: the length of the marriage, which was 
approximately nine (9) years; and th* financial contribution 
which the plaintiff maae to the marriage. The evidence at trial 
established that at the time the parties were married the 
defendant had completed medical school and /tfJfe completing his 
internship training. The plaintiff only worked for a short 
perioi of time during the parties' niarriaoo. During the parties' 
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marriage the plaintiff had the opportunity to continue her 
college education and to enjoy other social and educational 
experiences as she saw fit. The plaintiff did not make any 
sacrifices or contribution for any substantial period which 
increased the earning capacity of the defendant. However, the 
Court has taken into account the fact that, as a mother, the 
plaintiff did contribute to the family relationship of the 
parties. Plaintiff did not suffer from a disparity in earning 
capacity as a result of the marriage; in fact, she had the 
opportunity to enhance her earning capacity by education during 
the marriage. Defendant provided the funds to pay for day care 
and babysitters and for household assistance so that plaintiff 
could take advantage of furthering her career goals. The assets 
of the marital estate were acquired primarily from defendant's 
income. The assets consisted, at the time of trial, of two motor 
vehicles, personal effects, minimal furniture and cash and 
securities having a value of Thirty-Four Thousand Two Hundred 
Fifty-Eight Dollars ($34,258.00). This marital estate was 
accumulated solely by defendant's earnings, which averaged 
approximately Ninety Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Four Dollars 
($93,364.00) per year for the four years immediately prior to the 
trial . Thi s case is not an appropriate case for equitable 
restitution. At the time of the marriage the defendant was well 
on his way to earning substantial sums of money. Defendant's 
earning capacity has not been attained by significant efforts and 
sacrificos on the part of the plaintiff which were detrimental to 
her development. The Court should not make an award of equitable 
restitution herein. 
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45. Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees herein in the 
approximate sum of Twenty-Nine Thousand Dollars ($29,000.00), 
which is indicative of the fact that the demands made upon her 
counsel were not necessary. The defendant has incurred 
attorney's fees of approximately Twelve Thousand Dollars 
($12#000.00) herein, both to his present counsel and to a former 
counsel of record. The Court finds that the hourly rates charged 
by counsel were reasonable and that each counsel did a very 
respectable job in representing his or her client's case. The 
fees incurred herein were much higher than those usually charged 
in a case of this type. This was not a complex case, but for the 
animosity of the parties. This case did not present new and 
novel issues that have not already been addressed by the courts. 
In view of the circumstances of this case, it is reasonable, just 
and proper that defendant be ordered to pay a portion of 
plaintiff's court costs and attorney's fees incurred herein, in 
the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00). With the exception 
of this award of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), each party 
should be ordered to pay and assume his or her own court costs 
and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
46. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein. 
47. Prior to the parties' marriage, plaintiff was known by 
the surname "Donato," which name should be restored to plaintiff 
and she should be known hereafter as "Joan Donato." 
48. Each party has made various claims of contempt on the 
p.irt of the other party. The Court does not find either party to 
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be in contempt of court at this time, 
FROM THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this 
action and over the subject matter of this action, 
2. An Amended Decree of Divorce should enter from this 
Court in conformity with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED THIS day of November, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
JOHN A. ROKTCH 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Ccrpcron & Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing proposed Amended Findings of Fact and 
Ccnclusicns of Law to be served upon plaintiff by placing a true 
and correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
and depositing the same in the United States mail at Salt Lake 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN E. SCHAFER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATHAN C. SCHAFER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. D-88-2670 
This case was tried on July 13 and 14, 1989. The plaintiff 
was represented by David S. Dolowitz. The defendant was 
represented by Mary C. Corporon. The Court heard the testimony 
of the witnesses, received exhibits into evidence, and at the 
conclusion of the trial heard oral arguments of counsel. The 
Court being fully advised in the premises, now enters its 
Memorandum Decision. 
The parties stipulated as to the custody of the children, 
the division of certain assets of the marital estate. The 
remainder of the issues to be resolved by the Court were: 
child support; alimony; equitable restitution; payment of 
debts; the division of the various savings, checking, and 
investment accounts; and the disposition of a diamond ring. 
SCHAFER V. SCHAFER PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court advised counsel that the child support award 
would be in accordance with the child support guidelines. Each 
counsel submitted a Child Support Obligation Worksheet, but 
there was a difference of $30.00 between the total of the 
plaintiff's computations and those of the defendant. The Court 
accepted the defendant's computations because it took into 
account the cost of medical and'dental insurance. The Court 
awards to plaintiff $591.50 per month per child as child 
support. 
The Court awards to plaintiff and defendant one-half of the 
Merrill Lynch and Keystone accounts which were computed as 
follows: 
Merrill Lynch Account $24,940.00 
Keystone Account $ 9,318.00 
TOTAL $34,258.00 
At the time of the filing of the divorce, the Merrill Lynch 
account was valued at $31,193.00, less withdrawals of $2,253 
and $3,000 to pay debts and attorney's fees. 
Each party was to receive $17,629.00 as their share of the 
two accounts. The plaintiff is to retain the Keystone account 
of $9,318, and the defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff an 
additional $7,876. The defendant received credit for $435.00 
paid to plaintiff for car repairs and a visa account. 
SCHAFER V. SCHAFER PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court awards the plaintiff the diamond ring valued at 
$10,000.00, alimony in the sum of $650.00 per month, her costs 
and attorney's fees in the sum of $io,000.00. 
The plaintiff is ordered to pay the debt due her parents, 
her moving, and counseling costs. 
Defendant is ordered to maintain a minimum of $300,000.00 
life insurance on his life, with his children as beneficiaries, 
and plaintiff as trustee for the children. Defendant is 
awarded the cash surrender value of any insurance policies he 
presently owns. 
The Court addressed the issue of equitable restitution and 
considered the following: the length of the marriage which was 
approximately nine years; the financial contribution which the 
plaintiff made to the marriage. The evidence established that 
at the time the parties were married the defendant had 
completed medical school and was completing his residency 
training. The plaintiff only worked for a short period of time 
during their marriage. 
During the marriage the plaintiff had the opportunity to 
continue her college education and to enjoy other social and 
educational experiences as she saw fit to do. 
SCHAFER V. SCHAFER PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The plaintiff did not make any sacrifices or contributions 
for any substantial period that increased the earning capacity 
of the defendant. However, the Court recognizes that as a 
mother, the plaintiff did contribute to the family relationship. 
Plaintiff did not suffer from a disparity in earning 
capacity as a result of the marriage; in fact, she had the 
opportunity to enhance her earning capacity. Defendant 
provided the funds for day care and babysitters so that 
plaintiff could take advantage of furthering her career goals. 
The assets of the marital estate were acquired, primarily, 
from defendant's income. The assets consisted of two vehicles, 
personal effects, minimal furniture , cash and securities worth 
$34,258.00. The marital estate was accumulated with 
defendant's earnings which averaged $90,364.00 for the past 
four years. 
This case is not a true equitable restitution case. At the 
time of the marriage the defendant was well on his way to 
earning substantial sums of money. Defendant's earning 
capacity was not attained by significant efforts and sacrifices 
on the part of the plaintiff which were detrimental to her 
development. 
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The Court in making its award of attorney fees to plaintiff 
took into consideration the difficulty and complexity of the 
litigation. This was not a complex case, but for the animosity 
of the parties. This case did not present new and novel issues 
that have not already been addressed by the courts. 
The litigants made demands upon their attorneys' time and 
should be required to pay for that time. However, that does 
not mean defendant should pay for all the time that plaintiff 
demanded of her counsel. 
The Court found the hourly rates charged by both counsel 
were reasonable, that both counsel did a very respectable job 
in presenting their clients' case. The fees incurred were much 
higher than those usually charged in a case of this type. 
The Court concluded that a substantial portion of the fees 
incurred by the plaintiff were unnecessary. The defendant had 
incurred fees of approximately $12,000, and the plaintiff fees 
of approximately $29,000. which is indicative of the fact that 
the demands made upon her counsel were not necessary. 
In view of the circumstances of this case, a fee of $10,000 
would be reasonable to order the defendant to pay in behalf of 
the plaintiff. 
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Counsel for plaintiff shall prepare the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce in accordance 
with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this r$/ dav of July, 1989. 
^ - y — A. 
A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
SCHAFER V. SCHAFER PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this 2/ day of July, 1989: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Mary C. Corporon 
Attorney for Defendant 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
"—-ry^L^^ 
